Economic policy of Peter the First. The growth of manufactory production.
The growth of manufactory production.
Undoubtedly that a fundamental reform in sphere of economy was carried out during the reign of Peter the First. By typical opinion of historians, industry and trade were on the second place after army for Peter and his activity as a reformer was notable for large scale and foresight. Industrial building of Peters epoch was proceeding at an unprecedented pace for that time: not less two hundred manufactories of different profiles appeared from 1695 till 1725 and that was ten times more than at the end of XVII century, and there was more impressionable growth of total volume of output as well.
The most typical peculiarity of the economic boom in Russia at the beginning of XVIII century was the determining role of the autocratic in economy, its active and deep penetration into all spheres of the economic life. Such role was conditioned by many factors.
At that time in Europe a prevalent economic conception was mercantilism proceeding from the statement that basis of state wealth and necessary condition of its existence was accumulation of money owing to the active trade balance, export of goods to foreign markets and hampering import of goods to its own market.
The conception of mercantilism envisioned management of economy according to the ideas of politicians inspired by economists who promised prosperity to society. Such approach implied rather severe determining ways and means of achievement of this "general prosperity" by authorities. Among these means there were encouragement and compulsion and regulation of the economic life of citizens.
Peter the First, dreaming about the power of his state, was not indifferent to the ideas of mercantilism and its component - protectionism - encouragement of that industry which produced goods for foreign markets at the first instance. Ideas of compulsion in economic policy coincided with general ideas of "forcible progress" 1 which were practiced by Peter.
But another factor was more important - in russian conditions not only the conception of mercantilism conditioned the choice of economic policy direction at the beginning of XVIII century. The strongest stimulator of active unprecedented state inference in the economic sphere was unsuccessful beginning of the North War, which did not bring any captured materials or any new rich economic - developed territories. All artillery was lost near Narva, it was absolutely clear that it was necessary to create an efficient army over again. Numerous manufactories mainly of the defensive purpose were being built not for reasons of some abstract ideas about the necessity of encouragement of industry or about the computation to get profits, but for a reason of the hard determined necessity to provide army and navy with weapon, ammunition and uniform. A ting brook of deliveries through the Arkhangelski port could not satisfy growing needs of the country in different goods. Moreover having begun the war with Sweden, Russia lost its main source of deliveries of scandinavian iron of superior guilty used for weapon production and generally Russia found itself in the economic isolation.2
Just that very extreme situation predetermined character, paces and specificity of the industrial boom and feverish building. Proceeding from well realized interests of the defense, the state of Peter acted as an initiator of the necessary, in those conditions, industrialization. Possessing huge financial and material resources, the right of the limitless usage of land and its entrails and water, the state took the liberty of regulation everything that was connected with production, beginning with placing of enterprises and finishing with nomenclature of necessary products. The same process took place in trade. Principles and methods of administrative management of economy appeared and were being worked through in the state system of industry and trade created by Peter the First.
Certainly state monopolies already existed in XVII century but such global scales and depth of penetration of the state in sphere of economy were not typical for before - Peters Russia.
During the North war state business undertakings developed in two directions: the first direction - activization of production in old industrial areas by expanding existent enterprises and building new ones, and the second direction - creation of new areas of industrial production. It is important to notice here that first of all they built enterprises of manufactory type - the most progressive type at that time. Usage of different tools and instruments, division of labor, rather well - developed specialization of professions provided rather high, for that time, productivity of labor into manufactories in comparison with handicraft workshops. Certainly manufactory production appeared long before Peters industrialization and it already supplied different goods to the home market in XVII century. But real revolution in industry of the country happened only with the beginning of Peters reforms.
Both ways of development of the state undertaking-activization of old industrial areas and creation of some new ones-could be distinctively observed on the example of metallurgy - the basis of military power. The treasury invested huge financial resources to increase output of iron, cannons, and arms in areas of traditional production - in Karelia, Voronezhsko-Tambovski krai, in the Center. Here for the shortest time some new factories and works were built, old ones were expended, sometimes they were taken away from their owners who were not able to manage them efficiently and to fulfil large orders of the treasury. It could be distinctively observed that if Lipetski works were "attached" to building of fleet in Voronezh, needs of military fleet building in Petersburg were satisfied by Olonetski works, working on rather bad ore but situated near the war-theatre.
Ural played a particular role, there a large metallurgical complex was built for extremely short time. But none must imagine Ural of before - Peters time as a barbarous, sparsely populated and undeveloped land. By the end of XVIII century there were rather many little handicraft workshops and forges, many largest deposits were known, some attempts (but they were unsuccessful) had been already undertaken to build some manufactories. But the situation changed when the state, bending to Peters will, undertook industrial development. Already in summer of 1696 the Siberian command ordered the voevode of Verkhoturie to seek iron ore. The chief judge of Siberia Vinious A.A. was the executor of Peters will, he himself took part in investigation of Ural resources. The richest deposit of iron ore on the bank of Tagil (called "Magnetic Mountain") was recognized as most suitable. Having returned from abroad in august of 1698 Peter ordered to start building a metallurgical works there at once.3
"And for that works the great sovereign ordered to take good and necessary masters, a blast - furnace master with an apprentice, two or three men in the hammer shop, a good master on bellows who was skillful to mount cannons and bombs, large and little, and another master to make steel, a man for coal. All those masters must be taken from metallurgical Tulski, Kashirski, Jaroslavet Little, Vigotski and Pavlovski works and they must be sent to Verkhoturie this 207 (1698) year by winter way. And the great sovereign ordered to examine places there. And a good boyar skillful son from Verkhoturie must be appointed for this matter."4
At this decree the methods of creation of new manufactories in Peters epoch could be distinctively observed. At that time Peter actively used the experience of already functioning enterprises, the best masters were mowed to new places under authority of the total administration. Besides Peters residents in Western Europe actively invited foreign mining specialists and metallurgists, willingly going to Russia from Germany, England and other countries.
The foundation of the Uralski metallurgical complex was very difficult matter, and the first cast-iron went out from the first blast furnace of the Nevianski works only on the 15th of December 1701. That was an outstanding event: the birth of famous Ural industry, no one could imagine Russian economy without it. The first iron, not having match in Russia and abroad, was made from this cast-iron on the 8th of January 1702.5
A little earlier the state founded Kamenski works, in 1702 - Uktusski works, and in 1704 - Alpatievski works. From 1702 to 1707, at the same time with functioning works, some metallurgical works were built in Olonetski krai, in Ustuzhna, in Beloozero, in Voronezhski krai (Lipetski works) as well. Not less eleven works founded by the treasury greatly changed the situation in the heavy industry, having provided the country with iron, only for five years. Good metallurgical base allowed expanding the metalworking production too, more exactly - arms industry. In Tula, famous for its gunsmiths, a large arms works were founded in 1712 and Sestroretski arms works appeared in 1721.
Peter undertook the creation of manufactories in the light industry with great energy. In 1696-1697 the executor of Ambassodorial Command Krevet A. founded a manufactory producing sailcloth (needs for which were huge since the beginning of fleet building) in Preobrazhenskiy, on the bank of the river Yauza (with usage of its water) - that was called Treasurys Hamovni Yard. As always, Peter hurried, he ordered krevet to build water mills and to hire weavers from abroad and some russian weavers from Moscow Kadashevski Sloboda where wearing trade had long tradition. By the beginning of XVIII century Hamovni Yard worked at capacity supplying Admiralty with sailcloth. By 1719 Hamovni Yard was a large enterprise employed over 1200 specialists and workers.6
At the beginning of XVIII century a Rope Yard was built in Moscow - manufactory producing ship rope and also Tannery and Waist-belt Yard, providing the Army with ammunition and saddles. At the same time the treasury developed production of hats for the Army as well. A Hat Yard was built in Moscow for this purpose which worked till 1710 when hats were excluded from uniform of the Russian Army and replaced by cocked hats. At the beginning of the century some other treasurys manufactories were build for very short time in Moscow and Petersburg: paper-mill, fuelling-mill, button, linen, stocking manufactories. Cloth Yard in Moscow had a special place among them - the first textile production of "german" cloth, used mainly for needs of army that demanded tens of thousands of sleeveless jackets, caftans, and long mantles. Textile manufactories in Moscow, Kazan, Lipetsk worked both on imported and home-produced wool, and for this purpose some sheepfold works were organized in south uyezds since 1710s. The treasury was an initiator of other productions: glass, mirror, silicate and so on.7
In organization of industry, especially in first years of XVIII century, the State used all its advantages as much as possible. Centralized government allowed to determine rationally and guickly the area of placing, scales of production, means of providing it with everything necessary. Total authorities were ordered to support building of enterprises in every way possible. Building of works (especially metallurgical ones) demanded large financial resources that no one private businessman or moneylender disposed. Such resources were easily found in the treasury, not depleted yet by the war and that could intensify gradually pressure of taxes to population.
Some similar traits could be observed in foundation and operation of first large state manufactories of any profile. Enterprises were founded with optimal closeness to sources of raw materials, cheap labor of total population was used for their building, and low-paid unskilled workers were employed from total population. Experienced russian and foreign specialists were employed for organization of production. Similar traits were also in providing manufactories with equipment, raw materials, some part of them was bought abroad, and in sales of ready products, the most part of which went to needs of the treasury, because of manufactory industry was founded for this purpose during the preparation and the beginning of the North war.
The state combined creation of its own industry with organization of its own trade - mainly to get profit from popular goods inside the country and to import such goods, which could bring money to the state to purchase ships, weapon, raw materials, equipment for industry.
The state captured trade by the most primitive, but very effective way - introducing monopoly for purchase and sale of some goods both inside the country and outside it.
The first monopoly was monopoly for salt. The decree of the first of January 1705 proclaimed that everyone to the treasury could supply salt, the treasury would sell it at price two times more or the treasury might let one or some merchants to sell salt. The introduction of monopoly for this one of the most important goods meant the increase of price for customers, that meant the state wanted not only to take this profitable branch into its hand but also to get additional 100 per cent profit. By data of Pavlenko N.I., the introduction of monopoly for tobacco in the same 1705 year resulted in the growth of state profit till 800 % .8
Monopoly for sale of goods had particular importance. The introduction of prohibited goods also practiced in XVII century, but it had just huge scales during Peters time, it enveloped almost all kinds of goods which russian merchants sold to foreigners in Arkhangelsk and brought abroad through other ports and towns. Among such goods taken in the treasurys sale there were: juft, hemp, linen, linen seeds, bread, bristle, pitch, potash, caviar and isinglass, wood, chamois leather, rhubarb, fat, wax, sailcloth, iron.
But monopolistic policy of Peter the First should not simplified. But there were rather a lot of goods that were prohibited only for not very long period and then monopoly for hem was cancelled. The treasury sold a range of goods without prohibition of the sale to merchants but however the treasury was a privileged "merchant" with right of the first turn for purchase of raw materials and sale of goods in market. Raw materials were often brought as natural taxes from peasants (hemp, linen and others), ready products were supplied by private businessmen to the treasury by prices set by the state. Sometimes it was - prohibited making purchases till the full satisfaction of treasurys needs. Sometimes some areas producing raw materials were announced prohibited, that meant they were close for merchants.
Participation of the treasury in trade resulted inevitably in limitation, regulation of commercial activity of russian merchants, having the consequences - frustration, disorganization of commodity turnover, suffocation of free business based on market conjuncture. Certainly, state functionaries did not trade themselves - trade was farmed out to one or some merchants, thus the sale of goods was monopolized by a concrete merchant who paid a sum of money (all at once, or in parts) to the treasury, he tried to return this sum with interests at expense of the customer or the supplier of raw materials, thus he suffocated his possible competitors.
Peters epoch was the hardest time for the russian merchant class not only for negative consequences of monopoly for goods, the trade of which had enabled many commercial houses, merchant families to enrich themselves before. During the North war quantity of state services of merchant class increased very much, these services diverted merchants from commerce and forced them to fulfil some duties in the state government: reception of treasurys money, sale of wine and salt, service at customs. The introduction of some new taxes automatically meant that a new duty for the merchant class appeared - collection of these taxes. Direct and indirect taxes greatly increased during the North war.
State monopolies, taxes and duties were force measures undertaken by Peters government to get as large sums of money as possible for solution of its problems. And other Peters actions in field of commercial business had the same purpose and were extremely negative and destructive for commerce and the merchant class.
In 1713 a decree was published and confused minds of russian businessmen for long years. It prohibited bringing in Arkhangelsk from inside regions main goods of russian export: hemp, just, bristle, potash and others. These goods had to be directed in Petersburg - a new port in the Baltic.9
One could easily understand calculations and desires of the initiator of this decree - Peter the First. He proceeded from obvious for him notions: Petersburg - geographically and climatically - was more suitable for commerce with Europe, it was closer for western merchants than Arkhangelsk. But the volitional decision of Peter, based on logic and sincere desire to make quickly Petersburg - "the second Amsterdam", was not supported by the russian and foreign merchant class because of this decision broke traditional directions of good traffic. Arkhangelsk had some advantages, traditions, destruction of that was rather dangerous.
Yes, the way from Moscow to Arkhangelsk was longer than the way from Petersburg but it passed along beaten lived - the track, full-flowing rivers, people lived on the banks of these rivers and they worked for the north trade.
Yes, Petersburg was two times closer to Europe than Arkhangelsk but what could expect a merchant having gone hard, badly organized road to the new capital situated among boys? Lack of lodging and trade premises, high cost of living, lack of hands, mediators, storage and staging posts - trade could not exist without all this infrastructure - expected the merchant in "the paradise" where only Peter felt himself very well.
Further, it was 1713. Swedes controlled the Baltic Sea. The Russian fleet feared not only to accompany and to escort but also even to put to open sea. And western skippers preferred the risk of meeting Swedes in the Baltic. And of course Swedes did not intend to give possibility of free sailing in the Baltic Sea to their enemy.
But Peter the First was in inflexible. And though later he alleviated limits a little, but favorable " hot-house" conditions had been maintained for Petersburg for a long time and were consolidated in 1721 by the decree, according to it duties for goods selling in Arkhangelsk were a third more than duties for the same goods selling in Petersburg.
Certainly Petersburg really became the first port city in Russia some time later. But it happened much later than Nishtadtski Peace of 1721, many events that turned the country into the powerful Russian Empire. But in that situation of 1713 year the decree of Peter was a serious blow to trade and welfare of the russian merchant class and all population of the russian North.10
But Peter the First did not confined himself by these measures of encouragement of trade in Petersburg. He decided to create the merchant class of Petersburg by the same means that he had used at his policy rather often compulsion, constraint. After 1711 he wrote some decrees about compulsory movement of some thousand merchants and artisans from large and small towns to Petersburg. All attempts to get round the law were suppressed.
Peter used compulsory movement for other levels of population too. Every year not less 40 thousand peasants from all sides of the country built houses and beat piles in the new capital, dying in their dug-outs of hard labor, undernourishment and illnesses.
Peter resettled also noble people who had to build houses in Petersburg. But the movement was particularly painful and ruinous matter for merchants: trade leaned on connections, business relations, every house had its profile and the region of trade. All these connections were broken with this movement.
Everything that was said above-only a part of policy of merciless exploitation of the merchant capital by the autocratic state striving to get rapidly money and goods to solve its problems at expense of the merchant class and its professional business - trade. Monopolies, services, duties, taxes, movements, artificial limitation of commercial activity - everything was not in vain for russian merchants: historical documents witness about great ruin of the most well-to-do groups of merchants - they called "living-room of a hundred" or "quests". By data of Aksenov, if in 1705 there were 27 families in Moscow but in 1713 there were only ten families.11
But it should be noted that peasants also paid a great price for the victory in the North war. This victory became possible only owing to super-efforts of people.
The list of different duties of peasants-payers could impress us very much. There were duties of different types: 1) human (recruits); 2) labor; 3) carts; 4) horses; 5) staying; 6) natural (provisions, forage); 7) monetary.
Monetary taxes were divided into permanent and extraordinary. Dimensions of permanent taxes were stable for long years. They were formed from some groups of taxes. "Departmental" taxes were destined for needs of central departments. The oldest duties were "money of Yamskoy Command", "money of Military Command for dragoon salary", "ship money of Admiralty Command." Some permanent taxes were destined for building of the new capital at the beginning of 10s of XVIII century. A considerable group of permanent monetary taxes were class taxes that meant different classes paid them.
"Departmental", Petersburg, class permanent taxes were added by total payments differing in every region. Total taxes were made for total administration, garrison, post, roads, bridges so on.
But in spite of such variety of permanent monetary payments, one could surely tell that all these taxes were not very dangerous. They were only a little part of the whole huge mass of state duties. Extraordinary duties were the hardest ones as a rule they were mixed: monetary-natural, monetary-labor, and so on. Dispatch of provisions, recruits, workers, horses usually could not do without extra monetary payment.
Collecting and sending provisions - one of the hardest extraordinary duties - did not stop even for a year. There were some kinds of provisions called by the name of destination: "petersburgski", "pomeranski", "brianski", "azovski" and so on. Provision duties were determined in different ways in every region. In one places provision duties were collected in nature, in other places they were collected in "provision" money, in third places there were mixed: natural-monetary.
Though provision duties repeated every year, they were not permanent. Every year their quantity and assortment changed.
Besides provision delivery and payments peasants could get a decree about once more payment - "money added to previous payments." Provision duty was particular hard burden for those peasants in whose villages the russian army was located. They fed and supported it in their yards. For example, in 1713 provision deliveries were more expensive for population of Kievskya province, where the army of Sherementiev was staying in winter.
Considerable monetary payments were collected together with collecting recruits and horses for army Annual recruitment began in 1705. The first decree about recruitment of the 20th of February 1705 ordered to take a recruit from every twenty yards "only from 15 to 20 years old, single". These twenty years had to give money "for nourishment, clothes, shoes, fur-coats, hats..." Besides these peasants were responsible for this recruit and in case of his death or escape they had to deliver a new one.12
Large fines were imposed for not delivering a recruit or for breach of delivery. Recruitments followed one after another not only once a year. Recruitments brought: about 44500 recruits in 1705, almost 20000 - in 1706, 12400 - in 1707, 11200 - in 1708 and so on. There was a tendency to the growth of army by the end of the North war according to empires aims: 14000 recruits - in 1719, 19700 - in 1721, 25500 - in 1722, 10000 - in 1723, 20500 - in 1724. As a result more 400000 men were given in recruit from 1705 to 1725. But there were about 5-6 millions males in the country at that time. That meant every tenth - twelfth peasant had to put a soldiers uniform on, and of course recruits were more healthy men.
Labor duty was not less hard duty for peasants. Little and large buildings spread all over the country: roads, canals, bridges, fortresses and many other works were provided with manpower by labor duty almost without exception. Only by the end of the reign of Peter, his associates, having made sure in low efficiency of compulsory labor, passed to works by contract. But before it many thousand peasants were been taken away from their houses for long months.
Escape of peasants and trade people became a typical trait of Peters epoch. Strengthening of tax press resulted not only in growth of escapes but in strengthening of social contradictions, which often ended by disobedience to authorities, and sometimes by armed revolts.
Results of Peters reform.
Historians have not a united opinion about economical policy of Peter the First. Some of them think that it has artificial character and manufactories in Russia were an abnormal outgrowth, artificially engrafted to the economic organism of the country and which survived only owing to constant support and care of the government, but after the death of Peter the most of these enterprises were closed, that fact proved their lack of vital capacity. But other historians think that there were serious natural preconditions: well-developed home market, national private capital, and skillful manpower. And results of scientific research of last years show that if many little textile factories could not bear competition with peasant home production, larger enterprises of this branch worked till less the middle of XVIII century. Mines and metallurgical enterprises proved their high profitability without doubt, and the development of the young heavy industry were continued after the death of Peter the First.
The most obvious success of economic policy of Peter was creation of new industry in Ural that maintained its importance of the backbone in large production of the country till the middle of XIX century. Peters blast furnace excelled english blast furnace very soon and they turned Russia into one of leading countries in the world in this branch of metallurgical production.
Generally manufactory policy of Peter the First resulted in the fact that russian economy could overcome the backwardness.
Some conclusions could be made from all that was said above:
probably all economic reforms of Peter I were provoked by the extreme necessity to satisfy needs of conducting the North;
main means of passing the reforms were compulsion and constraint;
the economic policy of Peter the First was very hard for all classes of russian people, they all paid a great price for this industrial development;
but from historical point of view the economic reforms of Peter the First enabled Russia to overcome the economic backwardness and made Russia a powerful Empire.
Admiralty - адмиралтейство
apprentice - ремесленник
arms industry - оружейная промышленность
artisan - подмастерье
backwardness - отсталость
bellows - меха (кузнечные)
blast-furnace - домна
bristle - щетина
cast-iron - чугун
caviar - икра
coal - уголь
chamois leather - лосина
cocked hat - треуголка
commodity turnover - товарооборот
competitor - конкурент
customer - потребитель
decree - указ
delivery - поставка
departmental - приказный
deposit - месторождение
division of labor - разделение труда
duty - 1) обязанность, повинность; 2) пошлина
enterprise - предприятие
to farm out - отдавать на откуп
fat - сало
fine - штраф
forage - фураж
foreign market - внешний рынок
forge - кузница
fooling mill - сукновальня
functionary - чиновник
garrison - гарнизон
goods traffic - грузопоток
gunsmith - оружейник
hammer shop - молотная
handicraft workshop - ремесленная мастерская
heavy industry - тяжелая промышленность
hemp - пенька
home market - внутренний рынок
industrialization - индустриализация
iron - железо
isinglass - рыбий клей
juft - нефть
light industry - легкая промышленность
lodging - жилье
long mantle - епанча
manufactory - мануфактура
master - мастер
mediator - посредник
mercantilism - меркантилизм
merchant - купец
metallurgy - металлургия
metal-working production - металлообрабатывающее производсто
mine - рудник
moneylender - ростовщик
monopoly - монополия
noblepeople - дворяне
ore - руда
output - продукция
paper-mill -бумажная фабрика
peasant - крестьянин
pitch - смола
potash - поташ
productivity of labor - производительность труда
profitability - рентабельность
protectionism - протекционизм
provisions - провиант
raw materials - сырье
recruit - рекрут
recruitment - набор рекрутов
reign - царствование
rhubarb - ревень
Rope Yard - канатный двор
sailcloth - парусина
sheepfold works - овчарный завод
ship rope - корабельные снасти
skipper - шкипер
sleeveless jacket - камзол
sovereign - государь
steel - сталь
storage and staging posts - складские и перевалочные пункты
supplier - поставщик
tannery - кожевенный завод
trade premises - торговые помещения
treasury - казна
voevode - воевода
waist-belt Yard - портупейный завод
water-mill - мельница
Аксенов А.И. Генеалогия московского купечества XVIII в. - М., 1988. - с. 296.
Анисимов Е.В. Время Петровских реформ. - Л.: Лениздат., 1989. - с. 123.
Анисимов Е.В. Податная реформа Петра I. Введение подушной подати в России. 1718 - 1728 гг. - Л., 1982. - с. 27.
Богословский М.М. Петр Великий. - М., 1956. - с. 81.
Заозерская Е.И. Развитие легкой промышленности в Москве в первой четверти XVIII в. - М., 1953.
Кафенгауз Б.Б. История хозяйства Демидовых в XVIII - XIX вв., т.1. - М.; Л., 1949.
Павленко Н.И. Торгово-промышленная политика правительства России в первой четверти XVIII века. // История СССР., 1978, №3. - с. 59.
Павленко Н.И. Развитие металлургической промышленности России в первой четверти XVIII века. - М., 1953. - с. 51.
Спиридонова Е.В. Экономическая политика и экономические взгляды Петра I. - М., 1952. - с. 174, 176.
1 Богословский М.М. Петр Великий. - М., 1956. - с. 81. 2 Анисимов Е.В. Время Петровских реформ. - Л.: Лениздат, 1989. - с. 123. 3 Павленко Н.И. Развитие металлургической промышленности России в первой четверти XVIII века. - М., 1953. - с. 51. 4 Кафенгауз Б.Б. История хозяйства Демидовых в XVIII - XIX вв., т.1. - М.; Л., 1949. - с. 52. 5 Кафенгауз Б.Б. История хозяйства Демидовых в XVIII - XIX вв., т.1. - М.; Л., 1949. - с. 76. 6 Заозерская Е.И. Развитие легкой промышленности в Москве в первой четверти XVIII в. - М., 1953. - с. 130. 7 Заозерская Е.И. Развитие легкой промышленности в Москве в первой четверти XVIII в. - М., 1953. - с. 131. 8 Павленко Н.И. Торгово-промышленная политика правительства России в первой четверти XVIII века. // История СССР., 1978, №3. - с. 59. 9 Спиридонова Е.В. Экономическая политика и экономические взгляды Петра I. - М., 1952. - с. 176. 10 Спиридонова Е.В. Экономическая политика и экономические взгляды Петра I. - М., 1952. - с. 178. 11 Аксенов А.И. Генеалогия московского купечества XVIII в. - М., 1988. - с. 296. 12 Анисимов Е.В. Податная реформа Петра I. Введение подушной подати в России. 1718 - 1728 гг. - Л., 1982. - с. 27. 1 1
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